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I.

INTRODUCTION

In California, any city may become a charter city by framing a charter
and ratifying it by popular vote.1 Under the state’s constitution, the
ordinances of a charter city supersede conflicting state law concerning
“municipal affairs.”2 In 2012, the California Supreme Court held that “the
wage levels of contract workers constructing locally funded public works are
. . . ‘municipal affair[s]’” and thus that the state prevailing wage law could
not apply to those contracts.3 While the legal impact of the decision remains
uncertain,4 the California legislature has taken legislative action to render the
holding of Trades Council irrelevant by fiscally coercing charter cities into
abiding by the prevailing wage law.5 This legislation is now being
challenged by a consortium of California charter cities on the grounds that it

1. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 3(a).
2. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a) (“City charters adopted pursuant to this Constitution[,] . . . with
respect to municipal affairs[,] shall supersede all laws inconsistent therewith.”); see also JOSEPH R.
GRODIN, CALVIN R. MASSEY & RICHARD B. CUNNINGHAM, THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION
204 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (describing this doctrine as “the heart of the concept of home rule, a
philosophy of local government autonomy employed in many states as a [limitation on] the powers
of a state legislature”) [hereinafter GRODIN ET AL.].
3. See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 558
(2012). See generally infra notes 122–62 and accompanying text (discussing the history of the
prevailing wage law and related cases).
4. See People v. Nguyen, 222 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 1187 (2014), petition for review filed (Feb.
18, 2014) (citing a dissenting opinion from Trades Council to support the proposition that close
cases must be decided in favor of the legislature); People v. Godinez, G047657, 2014 WL 99188
(Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2014) (unpublished), petition for review filed (Feb. 18, 2014) (same); Stitt v.
S.F. Mun. Transp. Agency, 12-CV-03704, 2013 WL 121259 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 8, 2013) (commenting
that Trades Council specifically left open the question of whether state minimum wage laws of
broad general application could also be superseded by a local enactment that conflicted).
5. See infra notes 267–73 and accompanying text (discussing SB7 and its implications for
charter cities).
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violates the Municipal Affairs Clause.6
This Comment argues that the court in Trades Council reached the right
result, but the rationale of the decision was unpersuasive. The court’s
current Municipal Affairs Clause doctrine, which embraces a case-by-case
analysis, is unworkable as a matter of judicial review and is at odds with the
text, history, and political theory of the clause itself. The court has a
constitutional duty to enforce the state’s constitution as the supreme law of
the state, and that duty cannot be faithfully discharged as long as the court’s
analysis is governed only by broad generalities that purport to “bring a
measure of certainty” to a process characterized nonetheless by “mercurial
discretion.”7 If the court adopts an interpretation faithful to the state
constitution, the result in Trades Council must be considered correct and the
recent legislation designed to circumvent the state constitution must be
found unconstitutional as well.8
Part II reviews the history of home rule in California and the origins of
the Municipal Affairs Clause.9 Part III describes the development of the
California Supreme Court’s analytical framework for applying the clause.10
Part IV describes the background of the Trades Council litigation, the issues
considered, and the court’s holdings.11 Part V advocates a new rule
consistent with the text, purpose, and political theory of the state
constitution.12 Part VI explains why the California Supreme Court should
reconsider its approach to home rule cases and adopt the rule proposed in
Part V. Part VII analyzes SB7 under both standards and demonstrates the
superiority of the proposed rule.13
II. THE HISTORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL HOME RULE AND THE MUNICIPAL
AFFAIRS CLAUSE
The California Supreme Court has acknowledged the importance of
6. See League Strongly Supports Important Charter City Home Rule Litigation (Feb. 21, 2014),
LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, available at http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/NewsArticles/2014/February/League-Strongly-Supports-Important-Charter-City-Ho.
7. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991).
8. See infra notes 249–61 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 14–108 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 109–21 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 122–63 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 164–248 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 266–91 and accompanying text.
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history—specifically the history of conflict between the state and local
governments—for the application of the Municipal Affairs Clause.14 Indeed,
the clause itself is a product and a part of that history, and understanding its
historical context is essential to constructing a better analytical framework.
A. Dillon’s Rule and the Right of Local Self-Government
City and town governments have been a crucial aspect of the American
political experience from the time of the first colonial settlements.15 When
Alexis De Tocqueville visited the young nation in the 1830s, he saw in the
political life of the New England townships a form of liberty and selfgovernment essential to the American character.16 But the legal status of
cities has been a matter of bitter contention in the United States, and the
history of California’s city governments is a chapter in that broader story.
The legal and political conflicts over the status of city government often
overlap, and conflicting political theories have produced conflicting legal
doctrines.17 The most widely accepted statement of the legal relationship
between cities and state legislatures in America is the maxim known as
“Dillon’s rule,”18 which states that “the power of the legislature over
[municipal] corporations is supreme and transcendent: it may erect, change,
divide, and even abolish them, at pleasure, as it deems the public good to
require.”19 Judge John Dillon, for whom the rule is named, believed strong
legislative control of cities would protect private rights by allocating power
to the body most likely to consist of talented, public-spirited individuals.20
14.
15.

State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 557 (2012).
See generally EARNEST S. GRIFFITH, HISTORY OF AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT: THE
COLONIAL PERIOD (Da Capo Press 1972).
16. See ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 61–63, 68–81 (Henry Reeve trans.,
7th ed. 1847).
17. See generally Joan C. Williams, The Constitutional Vulnerability of American Local
Government: The Politics of City Status in American Law, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 83, 83 (1986).
18. It is widely acknowledged that Dillon’s rule is the mainstream of American judicial and
academic opinion. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057,
1115 (1980); 2 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 4.03, at 9 (3d ed. 1996). As
early as 1911, the victory of Dillon’s rule over the alternative theories was secure. See 1 JOHN F.
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 98, at 154–56 (5th ed.
1911).
19. 1 JOHN F. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 54, at 75
(3d ed., rev. 1881).
20. Frug, supra note 18, at 1109–11. This characterization is ironic when applied to the actual,
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But despite its confident assertion, Dillon’s rule was an innovation in AngloAmerican jurisprudence rather than a statement of the obvious or traditional
rule. Though it was well established by the time of the founding that the
chartered privileges of municipal corporations were secure from royal
interference,21 the relationship between the legislative power and the rights
of cities under charters was an open question of law.22
Opposition to Dillon’s rule was most famously expressed in Justice
Thomas Cooley’s concurring opinion in People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut,
which involved an act of the Michigan legislature organizing a powerful
“board of public works” that essentially replaced the existing government of
Detroit.23 Cooley argued that the constitution of his state presupposed the
prior and continued existence of local governments and could not reasonably
be interpreted as permitting the abolition of that self-government.24 He
concluded that “local government is [a] matter of absolute right; and the
state cannot take it away.”25 He did not reject regulation of cities under
general laws by the legislature, but he forcefully condemned special
legislative interference in the exercise of local power.26 The legislature’s
role, in Cooley’s view, was simply to provide for the incorporation of local
governments and to then allow them to function independently.27 This legal
alternative never gained widespread or sustained acceptance in the courts,
but the political opposition to legislative supremacy gave rise to the adoption
particular experience of state government in California under Dillon’s rule, at which time “few men
of ability [were] active in political life, and the struggle for office was carried on among men of
mediocre talent and often of doubtful integrity. The legislators were of especially low caliber.”
CARL BRENT SWISHER, MOTIVATION AND POLITICAL TECHNIQUE IN THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1878–79, at 9 (1930).
21. See An Act for Reversing the Judgment in a Quo Warranto against the City of London, 2 W.
& M., c.8 (1689), reprinted in 6 STATUTES OF THE REALM 171.
22. See Frug, supra note 18, at 1094.
23. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 52–53 (1871).
24. See id. at 99–103 (Cooley, J., concurring) (citing the “historical fact” that “local
governments universally, in this country, were either simultaneous with, or preceded, the more
central authority.”). Cooley’s argument was textual—it is not reasonable exegesis to conclude that
fundamental social institutions and values should be discarded simply because they are not
mentioned. See Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 98 (Cooley, J., concurring). Indeed, Cooley suggested, if
Dillon’s rule were publicly asserted—rather than adopted by judicial construction—it “would be
somewhat startling to our people.” Id. at 97.
25. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 108 (Cooley, J., concurring).
26. See id at 108.
27. See id. at 111 (“The right in the state is a right, not to run and operate the machinery of local
government, but to provide for and put it in motion.”).
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of “home rule” amendments in state constitutions—including the Municipal
Affairs Clause.28
B. City Government Under the California Constitution of 1849
California was certainly no exception to the universal American
experience that “local governments . . . were either simultaneous with, or
preceded, the more central authority.”29 Los Angeles, for example, was
founded as a pueblo in the 1780s, over sixty years prior to the annexation of
California by the United States.30 When the American forces led by
Commodore Robert Stockton captured Los Angeles in 1846 and Stockton
declared the territory under American control, these governments were
permitted to continue operating.31 After annexation, the number of
American settlers rapidly increased as miners came in search of gold.32 This
led to a great expansion of the number of town governments in the state as
the miners in the camps established local systems of government for
themselves—systems that included majority rule, trial by jury, protection of
property rights, and nonviolent means of dispute resolution.33 Despite this

28. See Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitutional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny,
86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1341–42 (2009).
29. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. at 100 (Cooley, J., concurring).
30. See George Butler Griffen, A Letter of Don Antonio F. Coronel to Father J. Adam on the
Founding of the Pueblo of Los Angeles and the Building of the Church of Our Lady of the Angels,
With a Translation and Corrections, 10 ANN. PUBLICATION HIST. SOC’Y S. CAL. 124, 124–26
(1915–16). The most prominent examples of pre-statehood local government in California were the
towns, such as Los Angeles, that had once been Spanish missions but were secularized and made
into civil governments under Mexican rule. See generally JOHN S. HITTELL, A HISTORY OF THE
CITY OF SAN FRANCISCO AND INCIDENTALLY OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 71–79 (1878).
31. See JAMES MADISON CUTTS, THE CONQUEST OF CALIFORNIA AND NEW MEXICO 124–25
(1847).
32. See HITTELL, supra note 30, at 132–33 (stating that in 1849 the number of settlers entering
California was equal to three times the territory’s previous population).
33. See generally Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. & C. Leigh Anderson, Culture and Fairness in the
Development of Institutions in the California Gold Fields, 61 J. ECON. HIST. 114 (2001). Justice
Stephen Field of the United States Supreme Court, himself a former California gold miner, described
these legal systems as follows:
Wherever they went, [the miners] carried with them that love of order and
system and of fair dealing which are the prominent characteristics of our
people. In every district which they occupied they framed certain rules for
their government . . . . [a]nd [their customs] were so framed as to secure to all
comers, within practicable limits, absolute equality of right and privilege in
working the mines. Nothing but such equality would have been tolerated by
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history, it does not appear that the delegates to the first California
Constitutional Convention gave much thought to the general structure of city
government.34 The resulting constitution said little on the subject: it
exempted municipal corporations from the general rule that corporations
must be formed under general laws rather than by special acts,35 provided
that the legislature “shall establish a system of county and town
governments,”36 and imposed on the legislature a duty to restrain municipal
taxation.37 In the absence of more specific textual guidance, the California
Supreme Court adopted—or rather, assumed without argument—Dillon’s
rule, holding that:
[Cities and counties] are both political and geographical
divisions of the State. They are both the subjects of its
political dominion. The local governments derive their
powers from the paramount political head, which, while it
cedes to certain local agents certain powers, does not
thereby remit its rightful and ultimate dominion . . . .38
Because cities and towns were understood to derive their existence and
the miners, who were emphatically the law-makers, as respects mining, upon
the public lands in the State.
Jennison v. Kirk, 98 U.S. 453, 457 (1878). The mining camp was, in the words of Californian
philosopher Josiah Royce, “a little republic.” Josiah Royce, California: From the Conquest in 1846
to the Second Vigilance Committee in San Francisco 280 (1886).
34. The only discussion of the subject appears in REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION
OF CALIFORNIA, ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION, IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER,
1849, at 126–28, 136 (J. Ross Browne ed. 1850) [hereinafter FIRST CONVENTION].
35. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 31.
36. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. XI, § 4. The mandatory language of this provision—“shall”—
supports the proposition that some form of city government was a constitutional minimum. See
People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29–31 (1875) (arguing from the mandatory phrasing of the clause that
the legislature is “required [to] organize cities and villages”); see also ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN
A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS § 11, at 112 (2012) (stating the
rule that “shall” ordinarily denotes a mandatory duty).
37. CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 37. One notable commentator has argued on the basis of
this clause that “the framers showed a greater distrust of local governments than they did of the state
legislature.” John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: I, 30 CAL. L. REV. 1, 7 (1941)
[hereinafter Peppin I] (citing CAL. CONST. of 1849, art. IV, § 37). The California Supreme Court
relied on a similar interpretation to support its reasoning in People ex rel. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal.
343, 355–56 (1859). But legislative power to limit specifically enumerated powers (taxation and
assessment powers) is not the same as plenary legislative control.
38. Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859).
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powers from legislative acts, their decisions were subject to direct legislative
intervention.39 Some of the special legislation passed under the first
constitution was comically trivial micromanagement.40 In some instances,
however, the interference was substantial.41 In People ex rel. O’Donnell, an
early case, the attorney for the City of San Francisco argued that legislative
interference in local affairs was never contemplated by the state
constitution.42 But the Court rejected that argument, and Dillon’s rule
became the law of the state.43 The power to alter city charters at will led to a
rash of special interest legislation that greatly increased the complexity of
city charters and produced uncertainty.44 The court even permitted the
legislature to regulate city conduct on a case-by-case basis.45 Because the
court reasoned that cities were “mere instrumentalities” for the exercise of
state power, the power of the legislature over cities was absolutely plenary.46

39. Although some acts passed during this period purported to “authorize” a municipal
corporation to undertake some action, the California Supreme Court “early held that laws of this
character would in many cases be construed as . . . mandatory.” See Peppin I, supra note 37, at 17
(citing Napa Valley R.R. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 30 Cal. 435 (1866)); see also id. at 18–19 nn.46–51
(collecting examples of such statutes “authorizing” action by municipalities).
40. See, e.g., 1875–1876 Cal. Stat. 180 (making it “unlawful for hogs or goats to run at large in
the Town of Woodbridge”).
41. See, e.g., People ex rel. O’Donnell v. Bd. of Supervisors, 11 Cal. 206, 211 (1858) (upholding
a special act compelling the city to pay, from a specific fund, a specific claim owed to a specific
private citizen based on the general proposition that the cities were subservient to the legislature).
42. 11 Cal. at 207 (“There are no authorities in this case. Like parricide, against which the
Romans had no law, because the crime was thought impossible, such an usurpation by the
Legislature has never been contemplated or guarded against, and no Supreme Court of any State ever
had to pass upon a doctrine so monstrous as that contended for by this . . . bill.”).
43. See id. at 211. This assertion of state supremacy, unsupported by legal authority, supports
the argument that Dillon’s rule is not a legal deduction but actually “a political choice . . . derived
from the hostility of liberal political thought to the exercise of power by entities intermediate
between, and thus threatening the interests of, the state and the individual.” Frug, supra note 22, at
1059.
44. See 2 DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF
CALIFORNIA 1060 (E.B. Willis & P.K. Stockton eds., 1881) [hereinafter SECOND CONVENTION] (Mr.
Reynolds) (“Here is a volume of fine print, three hundred and nineteen pages, that comprises the
charter of the City of San Francisco, to-day. Originally it was thirty-one pages, but there have been
one hundred supplemental Acts passed . . . . Dozens of these Acts have been passed in the interest of
a single individual.”).
45. See People ex rel. Blanding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343, 348–49 (1859) (upholding a bill
compelling a city to issue debt in order to pay certain claims, which were not legally valid, but which
the legislature thought just), overruled in part by People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
46. See id. at 350–51 (“The [only] security against the abuse of the power of the Legislature is to
be found in the wisdom and sense of justice of its members, and their relation to their constituents.”).
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The court justified its broad interpretation of legislative power based upon
the distinction between the federal constitution, which is one of limited
grant, and the state constitutions, which are understood as limiting
documents governing an otherwise plenary legislative authority.47
In perhaps the most egregious case of the period, the court upheld an act
of the legislature compelling the city of Stockton to donate $300,000 in
bonds to the construction of a privately owned railroad and levy a tax to pay
the principal and interest on the bonds.48 The city was to acquire no
financial interest whatsoever in the railroad; it was a pure donation.49 The
city issued the bonds but refused to levy the tax, and the railroad company
sought a writ of mandamus to compel the levy.50 In its decision, the court
essentially admitted the venality of the legislature, devoting considerable
space to an argument that the separation of powers prevented courts from
intervening to overturn even such obviously corrupt legislation.51
In the early 1870s, the court’s acceptance of Dillon’s rule faltered.52 In
the landmark case of Sinton v. Ashbury, the court announced the first
meaningful limitation on the legislature’s control of municipal corporations:
while the legislature could appropriate city funds for “municipal purposes” it
could not do so for “purely private purpose[s].”53 This limit, however, was
narrow, and the court continued to apply Dillon’s rule in subsequent cases.54
47. Stockton, 41 Cal. at 161 (“[T]he Legislature is politically omnipotent, except in those
particulars in which its power has been limited, qualified, or absolutely withdrawn by the provisions
of the Federal or the State Constitution.)” (citing Sharpless v. Mayor of Phila., 21 Pa. 147, 160
(1853)).
48. See Stockton & Visalia R.R. v. Common Council of Stockton, 41 Cal. 147, 157 (1871).
49. Id. at 152.
50. Id. at 157.
51. See id. at 157–58.
52. Stockton was actually the first sign that Dillon’s rule was beginning to falter in California.
Peppin I, supra note 37, at 25–26. Three of the five justices concurred in the decision essentially on
stare decisis grounds alone. Id.; see also Stockton, 41 Cal. at 193–202. Justice Crockett, in his
concurrence, argued that the legislative act was valid only because it used public funds for a public
purpose. See Stockton, 41 Cal. at 194–95 (Crockett, J., concurring). This distinction would later be
essential to his decision in Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871).
53. 41 Cal. at 530. The court used the phrase “municipal affairs,” which it appeared to equate
with things done for “municipal purposes.” See id. at 529–30. The standard used to define this
category is not clear from the opinion, but the court emphasized that “[t]he work . . . was clearly one
of great public importance.” Id. at 530.
54. See, e.g., City of S.F. v. Canavan, 42 Cal. 541, 552 (1872) (“[I]t is conceded that the
Legislature may create, modify, or abolish [municipal] corporations, and may direct the mode and
manner in which they shall exercise their powers, or may limit the extent of their powers . . . .”);
Creighton v. Bd. of Supervisors, 42 Cal. 446 (1871).
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Finally, in People v. Lynch,55 the court rejected Dillon’s rule in favor of the
doctrine expressed by Justice Cooley in Hurlbut.56 In Lynch, the City of
Sacramento attempted to assess a tax on real property benefitted by a public
improvement, but did not do so consistently with the city charter.57 To
remedy this situation and ensure the collection of the tax, the state legislature
itself passed an act levying the tax.58 The majority accepted Cooley’s
general theory of state constitutions: that there are traditional, implied
limitations on legislative power that must be assumed to have been intended
by the public in ratification.59 Further development of these limitations,
however, was rendered unnecessary by the adoption of California’s second
constitution.
C. Home Rule and the Constitution of 1879
The California Constitution of 1879 was created to remedy the
shortcomings of the original constitution.60
The convention was
characterized by deep distrust of the legislature, which “can be observed
both in the debates and in the finished document.”61 The new constitution
included five provisions that protected city governments from the

55 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
56. See id. at 19 (“The inhabitants of a city cannot be deprived of their right to have such matters
as are placed by the charter under the supervision and control of the legislative department of the
city government, passed upon by their representatives in the city council. The Legislature cannot, in
a special case, deny to the proper city authorities that discretion which they may ordinarily employ
with respect to local improvements.”).
57. See id. at 16–17.
58. See id. at 18–19.
59. See id. at 29–33 (arguing that the framers viewed local government as essential). Justices
Wallace and Rhodes disagreed on the basis of stare decisis. See id. at 40–41 (Wallace, J., concurring
specially).
60. See SWISHER, supra note 20, at 4–6, 9 (describing the massive population growth, economic
instability, and monopolization that combined to create a class of unemployed and disgruntled men
who would form the backbone of the “Workingmen’s Party,” a major political force in the
convention); Noel Sargent, The California Constitutional Convention of 1878-9, 6 CAL. L. REV. 1, 4
(1917) (describing the Workingmen’s Party, which thrived on anti-Chinese racism, antagonism
toward the capitalist class, and the widespread discontentment of unemployed laborers).
61. Sargent, supra note 60, at 2. Much suspicion of the legislature derived from the belief that
its power was captive to railroad interests. See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 1062
(Mr. Joyce) (responding to the suggestion of legislative approval of charters by asking: “Does he
want to have the charter of San Francisco adopted that way, so the railroad company can rob us as
they have for years past . . . ?”).
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legislature, and taken together, are the basis of municipal home rule62: the
prohibition of special legislation,63 the prohibition of special incorporation,64
the grant of a general police power to cities,65 the requirement that local
taxes be levied locally,66 the prohibition of dividing municipal authority,67
and the provision for freehold charters.68 The effect of the first four clauses,
taken together, was to prohibit micromanagement by the state legislature and
limit it to passing “general laws.”69
The subject of freehold charters was the cause of much debate over the
nature and role of local government at the second constitutional
convention.70 One faction, which included several delegates from San
Francisco and Los Angeles, was deeply skeptical of the legislature and
strongly favored local autonomy. Their floor speeches included tales of
egregious legislative abuse,71 angry outbursts against centralized control,72
62. Cf. John C. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California: II, 30 CAL. L. REV. 272, 272–73
(1942) (discussing these five provisions).
63. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. IV, § 25 (prohibiting special legislation concerning a long list of
subjects).
64. Id. art. XI, § 6 (“Corporations for municipal purposes shall not be created by special laws . .
. [but] by general laws . . . .”).
65. Id. art. XI, § 11 (“Any county, city, town, or township, may make and enforce within its
limits all such local, police, sanitary, and other regulations as are not in conflict with general laws.”).
66. Id. art. XI, § 12 (“The Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes . . . [for] municipal
purposes, but may, by general laws, vest [such power in a local public entity].”).
67. Id. art. XI, § 13 (“The Legislature shall not delegate to any special commission [or private
party] any power . . . [over] any municipal functions whatever.”).
68. Id. art. XI, § 8 (“Any city containing a population of more than one hundred thousand
inhabitants may frame a charter for its own government . . . .”).
69. 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 750 (Mr. Reynolds) (“arguing that under the new
constitution the legislature would “be confined almost entirely to the perfecting of the Codes”).
70. See id. at 1040–41; 3 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1406–07.
71. See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1062 (Mr. Howard) (“In the City of Los
Angeles about half a dozen fellows, with an axe to grind, got up a charter and sent it up here [to the
capitol] for ratification, unbeknown to the people of the city, and they got it adopted too. It
proceeded to organize a city government under the pretense of organizing a Board of Public
Works.”).
72. See, e.g., id. at 1060 (Mr. Wellin) (“What reason have these gentlemen to give why we
should not manage our own affairs. . . . Do you suppose that we are not intelligent enough—that we
do not know our own wants? Do you suppose we cannot send a delegation here to Sacramento that
know their business?”); id. at 1062 (Mr. Joyce) (“Does he want to have the charter of San Francisco
[subject to legislative approval] so the railroad company can rob us as they have for years past?”); 3
SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 46, at 1406–07 (Mr. Barbour) (denouncing the idea of subjecting
charters to ratification by the legislature as well as the people as “an abandonment of the whole
principle of self-government”).
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and passionate encomia to the virtues of local self-government.73 This party
advocated for the Freehold Charter Clause, which originally did not provide
for any legislative oversight.74 Another faction was suspicious of local
governments, especially that of San Francisco.75 When this faction found
that it did not have the support necessary to strike out the clause entirely, it
attempted to limit the clause’s operation, subject it to legislative oversight,
and make it less politically palatable.76 Despite such opposition, the clause
became part of the final constitution.77 By subsequent amendments, it was
restored more or less to the form of the original proposal.78
D. The Municipal Affairs Amendment
The spirit of the 1879 constitution and the home rule provisions was

73. See, e.g., 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 1062 (Mr. Howard) (“Now, sir, this
system of town government in the thirty States, and particularly in New England, has met the
commendation of many eminent men, and particularly of De Tocqueville. I know it is a good
system of government. I know it secures local rights, local economy, local good government. I have
heard, at town meetings in New England, discussions on public affairs relating to township
government, that would have done honor either to the Legislature or the Congress of the United
States. And it is the proper place for this power to rest, with those who know the local interests, and
who are thus able to provide for their own control.”).
74. See id. at 1059–60.
75. See, e.g., id. at 1062 (Mr. Freeman) (“[W]hen gentlemen here profess the faith which they
do profess in local administration of government, they must have had a different experience from
what I have read of . . . . It may be that the local township governments of New England have
operated as well as the gentleman says, but it is not true that in the great cities of the Union the
system has operated well.”).; id. at 1061 (Mr. Hale) (decrying the clause as “the boldest kind of an
attempt at secession”).
76. The first major argument against the home rule provision was that it singled out San
Francisco for special treatment. See id. at 1062–63. There is some evidence to suggest that the
section had been sabotaged in committee with the intent of defeating it on the floor: the very
delegates who were attacking the provision for being exclusive had actually pressed for that
exclusivity in the committee on local government. See id. Mr. Hale and Mr. McCallum, who
pressed the complaint that only San Francisco was eligible, were both members of the committee
that drafted the section. See id. at 1050.
77. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8.
78. In 1887, smaller cities succeeded in amending the constitution to reduce the population
threshold to 10,000, and in 1890 that number was further reduced to 3500. Amanda Meeker, Local
Government: An Overview of the History of Constitutional Provisions Dealing with Local
Government, in CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, CONSTITUTION REVISION:
HISTORY AND PERSPECTIVE 90 (1996). The requirement of legislative approval, however, was not
removed until 1974—simply to reduce administrative costs (no charter had ever been rejected). Id.
at 91.
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clear to the supreme court from the beginning: “[i]t was manifestly the
intention of . . . the [home rule provisions], to emancipate municipal
governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by
the Legislature.”79 The achievement of that goal was stalled, however, by
the clauses stating that charter cities remained subject to all “general laws.”80
In the case of Thomason v. Ashworth,81 the court reasoned that this language
permitted “the legislature . . . to control the charters of all corporations by
general laws,” meaning that it could regulate cities as a class.82 Despite
acknowledging the implication of this ruling—that city charters were subject
to any revision by the legislature so long as the revision applied to all cities
of a class—the court maintained that the constitution allowed the legislature
that power.83 In later cases, the court held that a state law providing for
police courts displaced similar courts organized under city charters.84 The
dissenters in Ashworth and the police court cases argued that the court’s
interpretation would frustrate the entire intent of the new constitution with
regard to city charters.85 The majority, however, was unwavering, and the
rules of Ashworth and Henshaw were ultimately undone not by judicial
construction but by constitutional amendment.
In 1896, the people of California amended the Freehold Charter Clause
79. People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880).
80. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8 (providing that charters are to be “subject to the
Constitution and laws of [California]” and supersede only “special laws”); id. art. XI, § 6 (providing
that all charters are to be “subject to and controlled by general laws.”).
81. 73 Cal. 73, 75–76 (1887) (upholding the application against a charter city of a statute
governing “the improvement of streets, lanes, alleys, courts, places, and sidewalks, and the
construction of sewers within municipalities”).
82. Id. at 76–78 (reasoning that such a rule was in keeping with the spirit of the home rule
provisions, which was “the inhibition of special or local legislation, and the allowance of general
legislation”).
83. See id. at 78–79 (“The evils of general legislation are such as spring from the imperfection
of all things human and the abuse of power; but the abuse, or liability to abuse, affords no argument
against the existence of such power.”).
84. See, e.g., Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal. 339 (1890); People ex rel Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal.
436 (1888).
85. See, e.g., Ashworth, 73 Cal. at 87 (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Court’s
holding would allow that a charter “adopted for San Francisco by San Francisco, can be amended
out of existence by statutes passed in the legislature by a majority composed in no part of members
representing San Francisco”); Henshaw, 76 Cal. at 454 (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
police court law had “altered, in a matter of most material concern, the city government[s]”
operating under freehold charters); In re Ah You, 82 Cal. 339, 344 (1890) (Fox, J., dissenting)
(arguing that charters were “made by the constitution itself . . . inviolable at the hands of the
legislature”).
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to provide that charters would not be subject to general laws concerning
“municipal affairs”—the origin of the current Municipal Affairs Clause.86
The Court’s earliest holdings under the clause were narrow.87 But a more
comprehensive theory of the clause was finally required in Fragley v.
Phelan, which considered a statute regulating election procedures for the
ratification of freehold charters.88 The court was unanimous in upholding
the statute’s application to charter cities but issued three separate opinions
that expressed three different views of the Municipal Affairs Clause.89
Justice Garoutte reasoned that municipal affairs were those matters which
pertained solely to the internal affairs of the city.90 This interpretation of the
clause was very broad, encompassing all the internal affairs of a city, but
those internal affairs did not include the ratification of a charter.91 Justice
Harrison believed that charter elections could in principal be a municipal
affair but disposed of the case on the narrow ground that the San Francisco
charter did not contain governing provisions on the subject.92 Harrison
seemed to allow that the exercise of any power granted to a city in its charter
was a municipal affair.93 Justice Temple, writing for himself alone, argued
that the purpose of the municipal affairs amendment was clear: the people
meant to undo the holdings of Ashworth and Henshaw.94 Despite his

86. See Meeker, supra note 78, at 90.
87. See, e.g., Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 460 (1899) (holding that the salary of police
and firemen was clearly a municipal affair, but providing no construction of the clause); People ex
rel. Cuff v. City of Oakland, 123 Cal. 598, 603–04 (1899) (holding unanimously that the procedure
for annexing new territory could not be a municipal affair—a contrary rule being absurd, because it
would give a city the power to expand its own power).
88. 126 Cal. 383, 385 (1899).
89. See id. (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 391 (Harrison, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at
400 (Temple, J., concurring).
90. See id. at 387 (arguing that the purpose of the amendment was to “prevent existing
provisions of charters from being frittered away by general laws” and to “enable municipalities to
conduct their own business and control their own affairs, to the fullest possible extent, in their own
way”).
91. See id. at 387–89 (citing People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 111 (1871) (Cooley,
J., concurring)).
92. Fragley, 126 Cal. at 395–96 (Harrison, J., concurring) (arguing that the crucial limitation on
a city’s power is that it can only do what is authorized by its charter). In a later case, Justice Temple
also affirmed this principle. See Fritz v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 132 Cal. 373, 380–81 (1901) (Temple,
J., concurring).
93. See Fragley, 126 Cal. at 395 (Harrison, J., concurring).
94. See id. at 400–01 (Temple, J., concurring). He disagreed with Justice Garoutte in that he
believed charter elections to be a municipal affair and disagreed with Justice Harrison in that he
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conclusion that the election was a municipal affair governed by the city’s
charter, he concurred in the application of the statute based upon the
legislature’s acceptance of the charter ratified in the election, arguing that
the very fact the legislature had passed the charter into law was “conclusive
evidence that it made the proper investigation and found the requisite facts
which would warrant its action”—that is, that it was the charter framed by
the city for its own government.95 None of these opinions was joined by a
majority of the court.96
Despite this lively debate between three well-reasoned views, the most
important early case attempting to construe the Municipal Affairs Clause
was Ex parte Braun.97 Braun dealt with the issue of whether a charter city
could levy a license tax against sellers of liquor for the purpose of raising
revenue rather than protecting the public health, safety, and welfare.98
Rather than describe and resolve the split represented by Fragley, the
majority vaguely asserted that the wording of the clause was “broad enough
to include all powers appropriate for a municipality to possess, and actually
Justice McFarland
conferred upon it by the sovereign power.”99
begrudgingly concurred in the judgment, insinuating that the amendment
was the result of democratic excess and complaining that it “uses the loose,
undefinable, wild words ‘municipal affairs,’ and imposes upon the courts the
almost impossible duty of saying what they mean.”100 McFarland despaired
of ever establishing a general definition and believed that subsequent cases
would be decided on their own facts in an unprincipled fashion.101 Chief

interpreted the San Francisco charter to address the issue. Id. at 400.
95. See id. at 403.
96. See id. at 385 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); id. at 391 (Harrison, J.) (plurality opinion);
id. at 400 (Temple, J., concurring).
97. 141 Cal. 204 (1903). Braun case is critically important because of its subsequent acceptance
and development in Federal Savings. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n. v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d
1, 12 (1991).
98. See 141 Cal. at 205–07 (finding that the charter of Los Angeles did provide it with the power
to raise revenue by way of license taxes, which conflicted with a statute providing that cities and
counties could only levy license taxes under the police power).
99. Braun, 141 Cal. at 209 (holding that license taxes for revenue purposes were obviously an
appropriate power for a municipality to possess and thus a municipal affair). See id.
100. Id. at 213–14 (McFarland, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to realize that the people of the
state, through their Legislature, have no longer the power to say that a license tax—a tax upon the
right to do business, a tax upon capacity—is unjust, unequal, and oppressive, and should not be
tolerated anywhere within the state; but we think that such is now the law.”).
101. See id.
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Justice Beatty dissented, arguing that the “sole purpose” of the Municipal
Affairs Clause was to overrule the Ashworth line of cases.102 The
amendment was not intended to exempt charter cities from laws which
applied to all the people of the state, and Beatty would have upheld the
statute as a general law.103
Subsequent cases did not provide a single, coherent view of the
Municipal Affairs Clause in which the court as a whole concurred.104 As the
law developed, the necessity of all powers being laid out in the city’s charter
gave rise to “bulky and sometimes complicated charter[s]” and frequent
To mitigate this problem, Professor William Jones
amendments.105
recommended an amendment to the constitution to rephrase the Municipal
Affairs Clause as an affirmative grant of local power rather than a limitation
on state power.106 That amendment was adopted by the people in 1914,107
and courts have subsequently held that charter cities receive, by default, the
entire power available under the constitution over municipal affairs and
charters now serve as documents of limitation.108 The modern court’s
interpretation of the municipal affairs doctrine, while it draws on the
language of these early cases, represents a substantial departure from their
principles.
III. THE MODERN INTERPRETATION OF THE MUNICIPAL AFFAIRS CLAUSE
A. The Growth of the Statewide Concern Doctrine
After Braun, the municipal affairs authority of charter cities gradually
became subject to “certain limitations of indefinite dimensions.”109 The key
limitation was that if a statute “affect[ed] a municipal affair only incidentally
in the accomplishment of a proper objective of state-wide concern” it would

102. See id. at 215–16 (Beatty, C.J., dissenting).
103. See id. at 217–19.
104. See ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION,
BACKGROUND STUDY RELATING TO ARTICLE XI: LOCAL GOVERNMENT 238 (1966).
105. William Cary Jones, “Municipal Affairs” in the California Constitution, 1 CAL. L. REV. 132,
145 (1912).
106. Id.
107. Meeker, supra note 78, at 90.
108. See, e.g., W. Coast Adver. Co. v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 14 Cal. 2d 516 (1939).
109. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 237.
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preempt a charter provision.110 The courts initially used the phrase “matter
of statewide concern” as the opposite of the term “municipal affair.”111 But
later the court held that an issue might be a municipal affair in the general
sense yet not “exclusively of municipal concern” and thus “not a municipal
affair within the meaning of . . . the Constitution.”112 When the Constitution
Revision Commission evaluated the local government provisions in the
1960s, Professor Arvo Van Alstyne suggested that such cases continued to
be decided in “pragmatic, policy-oriented” ways and that the doctrine should
be “recognized for what it is—an effort by the court in a particular case to
allocate the governmental powers under consideration in the most sensible
and appropriate fashion.”113
B. The Federal Savings Analysis
Eventually, in California Federal Savings and Loan Association v. City
of Los Angeles, the court took Professor Van Alstyne’s suggestion.114 In
Federal Savings, the City of Los Angeles sought to apply its annual business
license tax to the California Federal Savings and Loan Association despite a
statute in the California Revenue Code declaring the state income tax on
such corporations exclusive of all other taxes, including license taxes levied
by charter cities.115 The court held that, while the tax did concern a
municipal affair, “aspects of local taxation may under some circumstances
110. Wilson v. Walters, 19 Cal. 2d 111, 119 (1941) (citing Dep’t of Water & Power of L.A. v.
Inyo Chem. Co., 16 Cal. 2d 744, 753−54 (1940)). This limitation purports to derive from Pasadena
v. Charleville. See Inyo Chem., 16 Cal. 2d at 753–54 (citing City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215
Cal. 384 (1932)).
111. See, e.g., Douglass v. City of L.A., 5 Cal. 2d 123, 128 (1935) (holding that the safety of
public roads is a matter of statewide concern); Charleville, 215 Cal. at 398 (1932) (holding that the
employment of aliens on public works is a matter of statewide concern); Sandstoe v. Atchison,
Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 28 Cal. App. 2d 215, 221 (1938) (holding that the tort liability of local
public agencies is a matter of statewide concern); Armas v. City of Oakland, 135 Cal. App. 411, 421
(1933) (holding that the “organization, operation, and control of municipal fire and police
departments” is a municipal affair).
112. L.A. Ry. Corp. v. City of L.A., 16 Cal. 2d 779, 783 (1940) (emphasis added); see also In re
Hubbard, 62 Cal.2d 119 (1964), overruled in part by Bishop v. City of San Jose, 1 Cal. 3d 56 (1969).
113. VAN ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 239, 241.
114. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 17 (1991) (citing VAN
ALSTYNE, supra note 104, at 239).
115. See Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 6. The analogy with Braun is clear: in both cases a
statute purported to immunize individuals against some forms of local taxation. Compare id., with
Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 205–06 (1903).
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acquire a ‘supramunicipal’ dimension, transforming an otherwise intramural
affair into a matter of statewide concern warranting legislative attention.”116
Noting the extensive regulatory regime governing savings and loan
associations, the legislature’s purpose in passing the law, and the history of
Los Angeles’ license tax, the court reaffirmed its decision in Braun that local
taxation was unquestionably a municipal affair.117
Despite this
characterization, the court held that a matter so crucial to the statewide
economy could be subject to legislative control despite being a municipal
affair.118 The case law on the Municipal Affairs Clause had, in the court’s
view, come to embody a “dialectical” approach that resisted the categorical
separation of government into municipal affairs and statewide concerns.119
The court stated that in Municipal Affairs Clause cases it’s role is to balance
the city’s interests and those of the state on a case by case basis.120 But this
procedure, though characterized by a “sometimes mercurial discretion” is to
be constrained by a “decisional procedure” with three essential steps: (1)
determine that a subject constitutes a “municipal affair”; (2) determine the
existence of an actual conflict between the state law and the charter city law,
and; (3) determine whether the state law at issue is necessary to address a
matter of statewide concern.121
IV. THE PREVAILING WAGE LAW AND TRADES COUNCIL
A. Legal Background
The California Labor Code requires that all public works contracts
provide for the payment of the local prevailing wage.122 Wage support

116. Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 7.
117. See id. at 7–12 (discussing 1979 Cal. Stat. 4220).
118. Id. at 12–13 (distinguishing Braun as “only one side of the coin” and holding that the court
must sometimes choose between conflicting state and local laws which “both stem from concerns
rooted in their respective spheres of government”).
119. Id. at 13. The court did not overrule Braun, because the statewide concern analysis was an
addition to the case law which came after Braun and made the two cases distinguishable. See id. at
14.
120. See id. at 15–16.
121. Id. at 15–18 (stating that a thing which constitutes a matter of statewide concern ceases, “pro
tanto,” to be a municipal affair, and that these two phrases “represent, Janus-like, ultimate legal
conclusions rather than factual descriptions”).
122. CAL. LAB. CODE § 1771 (West 2013) (“Except for public works projects of one thousand
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programs for employees working on public works projects have been a part
of California law since at least 1897,123 but the legislature first adopted a
modern prevailing wage law, known as the Public Wage Rate Act, during
the Great Depression.124 Shortly after the statute was passed, the court held
in City of Pasadena v. Charleville that it could not be applied to charter city
when it contracted to improve a city-owned, city-operated facility using only
the city’s money.125 Because the wage rate on such projects was a municipal
affair, the court reasoned that the state law could not control, creating a casespecific exemption for charter cities.126 Decades after Charleville was
decided, however, a split of authority developed in the court of appeal, and
that holding was called into question.127

dollars ($1,000) or less, not less than the general prevailing rate of per diem wages for work of a
similar character in the locality in which the public work is performed, and not less than the general
prevailing rate of per diem wages for holiday and overtime work fixed as provided in this chapter,
shall be paid to all workers employed on public works.”). The law also provides minimum standards
for the employment of apprentices, LAB. § 1777.5(d), and procedures for determining the prevailing
wage and administering the law, §§ 1770–1781.
123. See 1897 Cal. Stat. 90 (setting the minimum wage per diem at $2).
124. See 1931 Cal. Stat. 910. In the same year, Congress passed the Davis-Bacon Act, the federal
prevailing wage law. Pub. L. No. 71-798, 46 Stat. 1494 (1931) (codified as amended at 40 U.S.C.
§§ 3141–3148 (2012). The original law was incorporated into the Labor Code when it was created,
see 1937 Cal. Stat. 241–46, and was subsequently amended to assign the determination of the
prevailing wage to the Department of Industrial Relations rather than the public agency awarding the
contract, see 1976 Cal. Stat. 587.
125. 215 Cal. 384, 389–392 (1932), overruled in part by Purdy & Fitzpatrick v. State, 71 Cal. 2d
566 (1969).
126. See id. at 393. The court emphasized the oppositional nature of the categories, noting that
no previous case had found state law controlling against a charter provision without finding that the
provision did not concern municipal affairs. See id. (citing Esberg v. Badaracco, 202 Cal. 110, 116
(1927) (school taxes); Ex parte Daniels, 183 Cal. 636, 641 (1920) (speed limits)).
127. Compare Vial v. City of San Diego, 122 Cal. App. 3d 346, 348 (1981) (upholding a local
resolution that conflicted with the prevailing wage law where the resolution “exclude[d] state and
federally funded projects and those ‘considered to be of State concern’”), with Div. of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Ericsson Info. Sys., Inc., 221 Cal. App. 3d 114, 123–24 (1990) (applying
the prevailing wage law to the University of California, which possess analogous home rule powers,
under the theory that it addressed a matter of statewide concern). The court in Ericsson argued that
Vial was distinguishable because of the indiscriminate nature of the University’s policy compared
with that of San Diego. See id. at 124. A highly regarded practice guide, however, regarded the
application of the prevailing wage law to charter cities as “in a state of flux” after these decisions.
See LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, THE CALIFORNIA MUNICIPAL LAW HANDBOOK §§ 7.84 (2011).
The supreme court itself acknowledged, by reserving the issue, that the continued application of the
municipal affairs doctrine to the prevailing wage law was an open question. See City of Long Beach
v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 34 Cal. 4th 942, 947 (2004).
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B. Facts and Procedural Background
The people of Vista, a mid-sized city in San Diego County, approved a
0.5% sales tax increase for the purpose of constructing and renovating a
number of public buildings.128 In order to reduce costs associated with these
projects, the city—on the advice of the city attorney—took steps to become
a charter city, planning to avoid the payment of prevailing wages.129 The
charter was ratified by the people and the city passed an ordinance providing
that no city contract would require the payment of the prevailing wage
unless: (1) the terms of a state or federal grant required it, (2) the contract
did not involve a municipal affair, or (3) the city council separately
authorized the payment of the prevailing wage.130 The city then entered into
several construction contracts that did not comply with the state’s prevailing
wage act.131 The State Building and Construction Trades Council, a large
construction industry union, sought to compel compliance with the act by
writ of mandate.132 In support of its argument for the application of the law
to charter cities, the union submitted a declaration by its president “asserting
the regional nature of the construction industry and describing
apprenticeship training in that industry.”133 The trial court denied the writ.134
The court of appeal affirmed in a divided decision, and the union appealed to
the supreme court.135
C. Holdings and Dissents
1. The Nature of the Analysis
The court held that the city charter provision superseded the state law
with regard to the contracts at issue, applying the Federal Savings analysis,
the general terms of which the dissenters did not object to:

128. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal., AFL-CIO v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547,
552 (2012).
129. Id.
130. See id. at 553.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. See id. at 554.
135. See id.
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First, a court must determine whether the city ordinance at issue
regulates an activity that can be characterized as a ‘municipal
affair.’ Second, the court ‘must satisfy itself that the case presents
an actual conflict between [local and state law].’ Third, the court
must decide whether the state law addresses a matter of ‘statewide
concern.’ Finally, the court must determine whether the law is
‘reasonably related to . . . resolution’ of that concern and ‘narrowly
tailored’ to avoid unnecessary interference in local governance. ‘If .
. . the court is persuaded that the subject of the state statute is one of
statewide concern and that the statute is reasonably related to its
resolution [and not unduly broad in its sweep], then the conflicting
charter city measure ceases to be a “municipal affair” pro
tanto . . . .’136
The opinions of the court, however, reflected a conflict about the nature of
this analysis. The majority emphasized that the analysis is a question of law,
finding that the court of appeal erred in emphasizing the factual record and
the Union’s failure to prove the statewide economic impact of the prevailing
wage law.137 Justice Liu, in dissent, criticized the majority for emphasizing
this point so strongly, sarcastically noting that despite its insistence that the
issue is a matter of law, “no clear legal principle emerges” from the majority
opinion.138 The court also divided concerning the factors used to weigh state
and local interests. The majority found that the economic argument for a
statewide response was unpersuasive given that the law only applied to
public agencies and was not a general minimum wage law of the kind the
legislature could rightly enact.139 Justice Liu objected to this argument,
arguing that while a law of more general application would have an even
136. See id. at 556 (alteration in original) (citations omitted); see id. at 566, 567 (Werdegar, J.,
dissenting); id. at 579–80 (Liu, J., dissenting). The court cited Federal Savings for the proposition
that state laws must be narrowly tailored to meet the statewide concerns implicated, but Federal
Savings itself does not actually say it is a requirement. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of
L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 24 (1991). However, shortly after the decision in Federal Savings, the court
construed Federal Savings as requiring narrow tailoring. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th
389, 403 (1992).
137. See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 555–58 (insisting that, despite the relevance of history,
the question always remains how the state constitution allocates power between the state and the
charter city).
138. Id. at 579 (Liu, J., dissenting). Liu accused the majority of employing the distinction
cynically to minimize the statewide concern. See id. at 583.
139. See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion).
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better claim to touching a matter of statewide concern the legislature should
not be precluded from using market mechanisms to achieve its goal by
leveraging “the substantial role that public works projects play” in the
market.140 The majority also distinguished between procedural requirements
and substantive requirements—the latter of which, being more intrusive,
would less likely be found to be a matter of statewide concern.141 Because
the prevailing wage law governed the substance rather than the procedure of
public works contracts, it was more suspect under this rule.142 Justice Liu
disagreed with this assessment of the relevant precedent, arguing that while
procedural regulation was subject to more permissive scrutiny it could not
therefore be concluded that substantive regulation received especially strict
scrutiny.143 The majority also rejected the argument that, while charter cities
had plenary authority to determine the wages of their public employees, the
wages paid by their private contractors were a matter of statewide concern,
finding that the distinction was “irrelevant.”144 Justice Werdegar objected
that the distinction was deeply relevant, because the contractor’s employees
are not even city employees and thus are very far removed from core
municipal affairs.145
These differences in analysis reflect different
understandings of the logic of the Federal Savings rule and illustrate the
need for a more coherent standard.

140. Id. at 588–89 (Liu, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 563–64 (majority opinion).
142. Id.
143. See id. at 589 (Liu, J., dissenting) (citing People v. City of Seal Beach, 36 Cal.3d 591, 601
(1984)).
144. Id. at 564 (majority opinion) (dismissing the argument because the Union’s economic
rationale would apply whether the employees were public or private). Justice Werdegar argued that
precedent demanded greater leniency in finding a statewide concern when the issue was fair labor
standards. See id. at 572–73 (citing Seal Beach, 36 Cal. 3d at 599 (upholding a meet and confer
requirement applied to city police departments); Prof’l Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of L.A., 60 Cal. 2d
276, 294−95 (1963) (upholding a labor relations law applied to city fire departments)). She argued
broadly that the state constitution gave the legislature “specific constitutional authority to address
labor issues on a statewide scale.” Id. at 571–73 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (2013) (“The
Legislature may provide for minimum wages and for the general welfare of employees and for those
purposes may confer on a commission legislative, executive, and judicial powers.”)).
145. See id. at 572–73, 576–77 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (citing Seal Beach, 36 Cal.3d at 591
(upholding a meet and confer requirement applied to city police departments); Prof'l Fire Fighters,
Inc. v. City of L.A., 60 Cal.2d 276 (1963) (upholding a labor relations law applied to city fire
departments)) (arguing that precedent demanded greater leniency in finding a statewide concern
when the issue was fair labor standards).
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2. The Precedential Value of City of Pasadena v. Charleville
In determining that the wage rates in the contracts were municipal
affairs, the court relied on the authority of City of Pasadena v. Charleville.146
The court emphasized two specific features the Vista ordinance shared with
the ordinance in Charleville: it concerned only city facilities and excluded
contracts that received state or federal funding or were otherwise matters of
statewide concern.147 The dissent argued that Charleville should be
overruled and that its legal and factual bases had been eroded by time.148
Both Justices Werdegar and Liu interpreted Charleville as relying on the
theory of Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.149 That case, and by extension
Charleville, represented to the dissent “a thoroughly discredited conception
of constitutional limitations on economic legislation.”150
This argument contains two fundamental mistakes: the failure to
recognize that the citation of Adkins in Charleville was dicta, and a
misapprehension of the issue in Trades Council. In Charleville, the court
cited Adkins for the proposition that a prevailing wage law of general
application would present “constitutional questions,” explaining why the
legislature applied the law only to public works projects.151 But the reason
why the legislature wrote the law in that way was irrelevant to the holding
and rationale of the case. The Charleville court made its decision solely on
the basis that the wages paid on public works constituted a “municipal
affair.”152 Furthermore, the law at issue in Trades Council was not a
minimum wage law, which the state has specific constitutional authority to
enact.153 It governs only the wages to be required by public agencies through
146. City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384 (1932); see id. at 558–59 (majority opinion).
147. See id. at 559–61 (rejecting the argument that the increased integration of regional
economies in the decades since Charleville had made the subject a matter of a statewide concern and
Charleville should be abandoned).
148. See id. at 570–71 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); id. at 586 (Liu, J., dissenting). They contended
that the logic of that case “has been overtaken by history” and it should be “consign[ed] . . . to the
dustbin.” Id. at 570–71 (Werdegar, J., dissenting).
149. 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in part by W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379
(1937) (cited in City of Pasadena v. Charleville, 215 Cal. 384, 390 (1932)).
150. Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 586 (Liu, J., dissenting).
151. 215 Cal. at 390.
152. Id. at 389. Charleville applied the California Constitution’s Municipal Affairs Clause,
unlike Adkins—which was an interpretation of the Federal Due Process Clause. See Adkins, 261
U.S. at 568 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
153. See CAL. CONST. art. XIV, § 1 (2013). Justice Werdegar gamely argued that this clause
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their contracting process.154 Such legislation is not within the state’s
constitutional power, however laudable its intention, and Adkins has nothing
to do with that conclusion. However, the use of Charleville obviated the
need for the court to determine whether wages paid under public works
contracts constituted a municipal affair. Therefore, the court only discussed
whether a statewide concern existed sufficient to allow state regulation in
spite of that conclusion.155 But this analysis, described in terms of balancing
between competing interests, obscures the true purpose of the municipal
affairs doctrine. While the court characterized the state interest as merely
abstract, the true rationale was that city funds should be used as the city
pleases:
[T]he question presented is whether the state can require a charter
city to exercise its purchasing power in the construction market in a
way that supports regional wages and subsidizes vocational training,
while increasing the charter city’s costs. No one would doubt that
the state could use its own resources to support wages and
vocational training in the state’s construction industry, but can the
state achieve these ends by interfering in the fiscal policies of
charter cities? Autonomy with regard to the expenditure of public
funds lies at the heart of what it means to be an independent
governmental entity.156
This argument has merit, but the court should provide a general construction
of the clause that relies on such arguments rather than an unguided balancing
of interests.

grants the legislature “specific constitutional authority to address labor issues on a statewide scale.”
Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 573 (Werdegar, J., dissenting). This argument is unavailing, because
the state did not address the issue on a statewide scale, but by commandeering the purchasing power
of local public agencies. See id. at 564–65 (majority opinion).
154. See Trades Council. 54 Cal. 4th at 564–65. Justice Liu admitted in his dissent that the
legislature chose not to regulate under a general law but to use the purchasing power and market
impact of state and local public agencies to effect its policy goal. Id. at 588–89 (Liu, J., dissenting).
155. Id. at 556 (majority opinion).
156. Id. at 561–62 (majority opinion) (citing Johnson v. Bradley, 4 Cal. 4th at 407 (1992) (“‘[W]e
can think of nothing that is of greater municipal concern than how a city’s tax dollars will be spent;
nor anything which could be of less interest to taxpayers of other jurisdictions.’”)).
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3. The Role of Legislative Findings
The most contentious issue in Trades Council was the degree of
deference courts should give to a legislative finding that a subject constitutes
a “matter of statewide concern.”157 The court acknowledged that the
legislature had determined public works wage rates to be a statewide
concern,158 but relied on a variety of cases to support the proposition that
such a finding was not determinative.159 However, the court continued to
acknowledge the rule that it must accord “great weight” to such a
determination by the legislature.160 The dissenting justices differed with the
majority about the degree of deference the legislature should be given, and
would have upheld the law on the theory that the case was close and that
doubts must be resolved in favor of the legislature because of the severity of
a constitutional ruling.161 The majority did not question the principle of
deference itself; it only limited its deference on the principle that courts
should be “‘especially’ hesitant” to defer to the legislature “‘when . . . the
issue involves the division of power between local government and that
same Legislature.’”162 Clearly, such hesitation is well justified. But in light
of the fact that all cases under the Municipal Affairs Clause concern the
division of power between local government and the legislature, what
justification remains for any deference at all?
These ambiguities demonstrate the need for a settled rule that may be
consistently applied by courts without resort to inherently political
judgments about which “interest” is less “abstract,” which necessarily
becomes a judgment about which policy is more important—a political
rather than a justiciable question.163

157. See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 561; id. at 566–67, 572 (Werdegar, J., dissenting); id. at
582–83 (Liu, J., dissenting).
158. See id. at 565 (citing 2003 Cal. Stat. 6247; 2002 Cal. Stat. 5541; 2002 Cal. Stat. 5455).
159. See id.
160. Id. (citing Baggett v. Gates, 32 Cal. 3d 128, 136 (1982)).
161. See id. at 578 (Werdegar, J., dissenting) (“[D]oubt . . . must be resolved in favor of the
legislative authority of the state.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); id. at 579 (Liu, J., dissenting)
(“[T]he court moves incautiously in an area where it becomes us to exercise more than the usual
caution.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
162. Id. at 565 (majority opinion) (quoting Cnty. of Riverside v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. 4th 278,
286 (2003)).
163. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 23–24 (1991)
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V. THE CONSTRUCTION AND APPLICATION OF A SETTLED RULE
The court has approvingly cited Justice McFarland’s exasperated
complaint that the constitution “uses the loose, indefinable, wild words,
‘municipal affairs,’ and imposes upon the courts the almost impossible duty
of saying what they mean.”164 Indeed, the court seems to have completely
abandoned the attempt to articulate a principled definition of “municipal
affairs.”165 This cannot stand. In light of the judiciary’s function within our
system of government, the court should adopt a settled rule for the
application of the Municipal Affairs Clause. That rule should be faithful to
the text and the structure of the state constitution and grounded in the history
and political theory of the clause.
A. Legislative Findings and the Role of the Courts
The majority in Trades Council, while accepting that the court should
give “great weight” to legislative findings of a statewide concern, insisted
that such deference was limited and that the court remained the final arbiter
of the issue.166 Even this falls short of the court’s constitutional duty. The
history of constitutional home rule makes clear that the primary motivation
for dividing the state’s sovereignty was distrust of the legislature.167 And
while the legislature represents the will of the people of California, the
constitution does as well.168 While “[i]t is not a light thing to set aside an act
of the legislature,”169 the court has a duty to uphold the constitution.170 The
164. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214 (1903) (McFarland, J. concurring) (quoted in Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal.3d 1, 15–16 (1991)).
165. See, e.g., Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 558–59 (relying solely on precedent to determine
that wage rates in public works contracts are a municipal affair without articulating any standard
other than the Federal Savings analysis for making that determination in cases of first impression).
166. 54 Cal. 4th at 558.
167. See supra notes 60–78 and accompanying text.
168. Even more direct expressions of the people’s will—such as ballot initiatives—are subject to
constitutional scrutiny because “the people have made statutes . . . subordinate to the Constitution,
and have empowered the courts of this state in the exercise of the judicial power to interpret the
state’s fundamental charter.” People’s Advocate v. Superior Court (California Legislature), 181 Cal.
App. 3d 316, 322 (1986).
169. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 390 (1899).
170. See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 25−26 (1875) (“The courts cannot shirk the responsibility
of deciding such questions, when presented. It is as much their duty to consider the Constitution, in
ascertaining what is the law, as to consider the statute. This duty must be performed, whatever the
consequences. The judicial department is the proper power in the Government to determine whether
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court, under the constitution, has “ample power” to police the use of
legislative authority and “preserve the core meaning of municipal home
rule,” and it is obliged to do so.171 The court should clearly affirm that the
legislature has no place in determining the extent of its own constitutional
power and adopt a clear, readily applicable construction of the Municipal
Affairs Clause. The formulation of that construction must begin with the
text.
B. The Text of the Clause: “All” Means “All”
Legal interpretation begins with the text of the instrument to be
construed.172 The term “municipal affairs” is “notoriously ambiguous”,173
but even an ambiguous phrase must be given a meaning which the that will
bear.174 This precludes the court’s understanding—finally articulated in
Federal Savings but nascent in the cases following Braun—that a subject
may constitute a municipal affair but still be subject to state preemption if it
also constitutes a matter of statewide concern.175 This simply cannot be the
meaning of the text, because the text clearly states that with respect to
municipal affairs, charter provisions “shall supersede all laws inconsistent
therewith.”176 At the time the clause was added, the word “municipal,” as a
legal term of art, denoted simply “that which belongs to a corporation or a
city . . . includ[ing] the rules or laws by which a particular district,
community, or nation is governed.”177 The word “affairs” is a word of much
“wide[r] import,” and is even broader than simply “business.”178 This text
will bear a number of different meanings. It could bear a meaning as narrow
as a municipal version of the corporate internal affairs doctrine.179 It could
also bear a meaning as broad as “all powers appropriate for a municipality to
a statute be or be not constitutional.” (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
171. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1991).
172. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 16.
173. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1344.
174. SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, at 31 (“A fundamental rule of textual interpretation is
that neither a word nor a sentence may be given a meaning that it cannot bear.”).
175. See supra notes 111–21 and accompanying text.
176. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a) (2013) (emphasis added). It does not say “all laws inconsistent
therewith which do not reach matters of statewide concern.”
177. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, A LAW DICTIONARY 798 (1910).
178. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 394–95 (1899) (Harrison, J., concurring).
179. See id. at 385 (plurality opinion)
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possess and actually conferred upon it by the sovereign power.”180 But
grammar itself forbids construing “all laws inconsistent therewith”181 to
mean all laws not touching matters of statewide concern.
But the term “municipal affairs” predates the 1896 amendment adding
the clause to the constitution, and its use in case law is instructive.182 In
1871, when California still applied Dillon’s Rule, the court used the phrase
to describe the range of purposes for which the legislature may use city
funds.183 In 1875, when the court held there was a right to local selfgovernment, it used the term similarly, equating it with “matters of purely
local concern.”184 After the passage of the 1879 Constitution, the term
continued to be used.185 It was used in one case to mean anything pertaining
to the corporate structure or governance of the city.186 Whatever may be
concluded from these instances, this much is clear: the term is, as Justice
Harrison wrote, one of “wide import” and seems to embrace nearly
everything a city does that is of public importance.187 But the early case law
definitions are not the only—or even the best—resources available to the
court.

180. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209 (1903)
181. CAL. CONST. art. XI, §5(a) (2013) (emphasis added).
182. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 36, §54, at 322 (“If a statute uses words or phrases that
have already received authoritative construction by the jurisdiction’s court of last resort . . . they are
to be understood according to that construction.”). After the passage of the municipal affairs
amendment, the court appealed to Sinton, an 1871 case, as authority for the proposition that the
opening of streets was a municipal affair under the meaning of the clause. See Byrne v. Drain, 127
Cal. 663, 667 (1900) (citing Sinton v. Ashbury, 41 Cal. 525 (1871)). This citation suggests that the
court recognized the case law usage of the phrase prior to the amendment as a legitimate source of
interpretive guidance. See id.
183. See Sinton, 41 Cal. at 530 (1871) (Crockett, J.) (“I am not aware that any case has gone so
far as to hold that the Legislature may devote the funds of a municipal corporation to purposes
confessedly private and having no relation to municipal affairs.”).
184. People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 31 (1875).
185. See People ex rel. Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 448 (1888) (McKinstry, J., dissenting)
(citing an unpublished superior court opinion describing a law as “‘distinctly municipal in character,
spending its whole force upon the government, civil and criminal, of the city of Oakland and the
regulation of its internal municipal affairs.’”). See also Dunn v. Long Beach Land & Water Co., 114
Cal. 605, 610 (1896); Woodward v. Fruitvale Sanitary Dist., 99 Cal. 554, 562 (1893).
186. See Henshaw, 76 Cal. at 448–50 (McKinstry, J., dissenting).
187. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 394–95 (Harrison, J., concurring).
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C. The Purpose of the Clause: Local Laws and General Laws
When constitutional text is not clear, the interpreter should have
recourse to the structural purpose of the provision in question.188 The case
law interpreting the amendment itself prior to Justice McFarland’s surrender
of the interpretive enterprise in Ex parte Braun provides useful insights into
the structural purpose of the amendment.189 After the amendment, the court
clearly stated what it took to be the intent of the amendment: “[I]t had been
believed by the legislature and by the people that it would be wiser to relieve
charter cities from the operation of general laws affecting municipal affairs,
lest otherwise there would be danger of the charter provisions being entirely
‘frittered away.’”190 Among the early theories proposed concerning what the
people intended when they passed the Municipal Affairs Clause, there was
broad agreement that they intended to correct something that had gone
wrong in the interpretation of the Constitution of 1879 itself.191 For that
reason, the court continued to hold that the purpose of the “municipal
affairs” language was to further restrict the legislature from interfering in
matters that concern cities “under the guise of laws general in form.”192 In
Fragley v. Phelan, the justices articulated two cogent constructions of the
Municipal Affairs Clause based upon the political context and intent of the
amendment—neither of which was discussed by Justice McFarland in Braun
or the court in Federal Savings.193
The first theory, advanced by Justices Garoutte and Harrison, was that
the phrase is of “wide import” and encompasses all of the matters which are

188. 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §405
(“Where the words admit of two senses, each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense
is to be adopted, which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best harmonizes with
the nature and objects, the scope and design of the instrument.”).
189. See supra notes 79–108 and accompanying text.
190. Morton v. Broderick, 118 Cal. 474, 486–87 (1897) (internal citations omitted).
191. Fragley, 126 Cal. at 387 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion) (arguing that the people wished to
protect charters from being “frittered away” by laws general in form but not in substance); id. at 395
(Harrison, J., concurring) (arguing that municipal affairs included all things embraced in a charter,
basically accepting Justice Garoutte’s view of the people’s purpose); id. at 400–01 (Temple, J.,
concurring) (arguing that the people intended to undo Ashworth and Henshaw, which had frustrated
the original purpose of freehold charters).
192. Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899).
193. See Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383 (1899); Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204 (1903); Cal. Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1 (1991).
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committed to the city’s control.194 On this view, the municipal affairs of a
city comprise all of the things provided for in its charter.195 This view is
based on the notion that a charter is a negotiated settlement between the city
and the state legislature, and that the legislature by approving the charter has
“part[ed] with a portion of its sovereignty” and granted it to the city.196 This
theory has some appeal because it is simple to apply: if a power is in the
charter—a document that a court can read—it pertains to a municipal affair.
However, whatever viability this theory once had was eliminated with
subsequent amendments that rephrased the clause in terms of a general grant
of power to cities rather than a limit on the legislature and removed the
legislature from the ratification process.197 Because of the 1914 amendment,
the text of city charters no longer provides greater interpretive guidance than
the phrase “municipal affairs” itself.198 Additionally, the later amendments
that removed the legislature from the process make it difficult to speak of the
legislature as having “part[ed] with a portion of its sovereignty.”199
The other view presented in Fragley is that of Justice Temple, who
believed the people intended only to undo the holdings of Ashworth and
Henshaw.200 This view is immediately attractive because it, like the modern
case law, does not rely solely upon the words themselves, which “convey[]
no definite meaning to [the] mind.”201 Instead, it provides a definite,
ascertainable meaning for the clause based upon its context: “the author of
the amendment had in mind the contention of the justices who dissented
from the established doctrine.”202 The doctrine of those dissenters is clear
from their opinions.203 It is rooted in the common law distinction between
194. Fragley, 126 Cal. at 394–95 (Harrison, J).
195. See id. at 395 (Harrison, J., concurring).
196. Id. at 389 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion); see id. at 395–96 (Harrison, J., concurring).
197. See Meeker, supra note 78, at 91.
198. See, e.g., Charter of the City of Vista §§ 100–101, 300 (specifically declaring the city
exempt from public contracting statutes except as approved by the City Council and enumerating no
other powers).
199. Fragley, 126 Cal. at 389 (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion).
200. See id. at 400–01 (Temple, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 402; compare id., with Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal.3d 1, 16
(1991).
202. Fragley, 126 Cal. at 401 (Temple, J., concurring); cf. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 12
(1890) (also reasoning that a constitutional amendment passed in reaction to a particular case should
be construed in light of the dissenting opinions in that case).
203. See id. The primary dissenters from the doctrine of Ashworth were Justices McKinstry and
Fox. See Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 87 (1887) (McKinstry, J., dissenting); People ex rel.
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general laws or general customs and local laws or particular customs—the
former operating on “all persons and in all places” within the territory of the
state and the latter applying only in particular places.204 According to Justice
McKinstry, the entire structure of the constitution of 1879 was designed to
favor local power on questions of local custom and law.205 Under this view,
a state law may only be applied within a charter city if it is capable of being
applied throughout the entire territory of the state, which would include laws
relating to the general rights and duties of citizens, the administration of the
courts, and all other laws that apply beyond as well as within the boundaries
of cities.206 Furthermore, under this construction, the state is empowered to
take action through general laws, but that action does not preclude municipal
action through local laws pertaining to the very same matter, provided the
two are not contradictory.207 While cases would arise under this rule
requiring elaboration of the local–general distinction, such elaboration could
be guided by reference to the political theory of the clause.
D. The Theory of the Clause: Localism and Federalism
In addition to being textually permissible and historically plausible, the
court’s interpretation of the Municipal Affairs Clause should preserve the
core political commitments of constitutional home rule.208 Previous
scholarship has tended to see constitutional home rule as an innovation in
state government rather than a foundational political principle like
federalism.209 This common assumption, however, is not historically
Daniels v. Henshaw, 76 Cal. 436, 454 (1888) (McKinstry, J., dissenting); Ex parte Ah You, 82 Cal.
339, 344 (1890) (Fox, J., dissenting); Davies v. City of L.A., 86 Cal. 37, 54 (1890) (Fox, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
204. Davies, 86 Cal. at 54 (Fox, J., dissenting).
205. Ashworth, 73 Cal. at 91–92.
206. See id. at 92.
207. See People ex rel. Lawlor v. Williamson, 135 Cal. 415, 416–20 (1902) (holding that a writ of
quo warranto sought by the San Francisco board of public health, established by the legislature,
would not issue against the new San Francisco board of public health, created by the city’s charter,
and that insofar as the two boards did not have conflicting powers, the state and the city could both
maintain boards of health).
208. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 15 (1991).
209. Baker & Rodriguez, supra note 28, at 1342 (“[Judicially enforceable home rule] was
extraordinary . . . in the further sense that courts would be acting to protect the autonomy of local
governments that were historically understood to be mere creatures of the state government. On
these terms, imperium in imperio home rule was even more remarkable than constitutional
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justified. In fact, Dillon’s rule itself was an innovation, though its
proponents asserted it as though it were the “historically understood” rule.210
Federalism and home rule are, in fact, analogous. The essence of federalism
is that powers are divided between the state and national governments based
not solely on the territory covered but also on the subjects that may be
regulated.211 The system is fundamentally “anti-hierarchical, based on
covenant[al] principles that see the proper political organization as a matrix
with larger and smaller arenas but not higher and lower.”212 And it is
eminently practical—power is made to reside where it will be needed while
preserving the authority of other entities in the system.213 The foundation of
this covenantal, federal system is the pre-existence of the state governments;
while the people of the entire United States are collectively sovereign,214 the
Constitution was written in the context of preexisting states, which—while
forming an indissoluble union—did not part with their independent existence
when the national government was created.215 Despite the mistaken opinions
federalism. After all, the latter was built upon the circumstances of the states existing as
independent sovereigns that joined together to form the nation, the United States.”).
210. Id.; see also supra, notes 18–21, 43 and accompanying text.
211. The national government is given power over a specific range of subjects, see U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 8, and the remainder is vested in “the [s]tates respectively, or . . . the people,” U.S. CONST.
amend. X.
212. Daniel J. Elazar, The United States and the European Union: Models for Their Epochs, in
THE FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION 31, 42 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001). In this way, the
American system is different from other systems of decentralized government:
Historically, [the European tradition of] subsidiarity has assumed that there is
a centre of power that rules over an organic or quasi-organic polity . . . .
[Whereas] the American federal tradition has assumed that there is not, and
should not be, a single centre of power. The States are not peripheries, and
local governments are not extremities; they are constituent elements of what
James Madison called a “compound republic.”
John Kincaid, Devolution in the United States: Rhetoric and Reality, in THE FEDERAL VISION:
LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE EUROPEAN UNION
144, 155 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse, eds. 2001).
213. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 581 (1985) (O’Connor, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Framers of our Constitution intended Congress to have sufficient power to
address national problems. . . . [T]hey also envisioned a republic whose vitality was assured by the
diffusion of power not only among the branches of the Federal Government, but also between the
Federal Government and the States.”).
214. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 839–40 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
215. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700, 724−25 (1868) (“[T]he perpetuity and indissolubility of
the Union, by no means implies the loss of distinct and individual existence, or of the right of selfgovernment by the States. . . . The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
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of those courts that view cities as always and everywhere creatures of the
state, the same relationship of preexistence and indissolubility exists
between the states and the cities within their territory.216 In California, the
court has explicitly recognized this pre-existing tradition of local
government217 and the resulting relationship between the sovereign people,
the state, and cities:
It is of course true that [municipal affairs] . . . may at all times be
controlled by the sovereign power. But it does not follow that the
legislative department of the state may so control it. . . . The state
constitution is . . . the highest expression of the will of the people of
the state, and so far as it speaks, represents the state. So, where . . .
power is given in the constitutional method by special charter, and
not by direct legislative enactment, it can be withdrawn only by
amendment to the charter in the manner provided by the
constitution.218
The implications of divided sovereignty are not always obvious, even in the
context of federalism.219 However, the American legal tradition is replete
with examples of courts parsing the meaning of federalism and its legal
implications. Because the political theory of home rule is analogous to that
of federalism, several of these legal doctrines are useful in illuminating the
Municipal Affairs Clause.
The municipal affairs doctrine is clearly analogous to the “traditional
state functions” doctrine of National League of Cities v. Usery.220 The terms

Union, composed of indestructible States.”).
216. People ex rel. Le Roy v. Hurlbut, 24 Mich. 44, 98 (1871) (“[T]he [state] constitution has
been adopted in view of a system of local government, well understood and tolerably uniform in
character, existing from the very earliest settlement of the country, never for a moment suspended or
displaced, and the continued existence of which is assumed; and . . . the liberties of the people have
generally been supposed to spring from, and be dependent upon that system.”).
217. See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15, 29–31 (1875).
218. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 211 (1903).
219. One commentator has quipped that “[t]alking about federalism feels a bit like joining the
proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant.” Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1485 (1994). For an entertaining version of the story to which Kramer refers,
see John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant, in THE OXFORD ILLUSTRATED BOOK OF
AMERICAN CHILDREN’S POEMS 24–25 (Donald Hall ed., 1999).
220. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S.
528 (1985).
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“municipal affairs” and “traditional governmental functions” both rely for
their meaning on the nature of the entity whose independence is being
protected—a thing is a “municipal affair” if it is properly handled by a
municipality,221 and a thing is a “traditional governmental function” if it is
handled traditionally by the states.222 In National League, the United States
Supreme Court held that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act could not be
applied to state governments.223 The Court based its decision on what it took
to be an established principle that the “power of Congress to override state
sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
regulate commerce” has limits.224 These limits include the principle that the
states’ “integrity” and ability to function as separate governments must be
respected.225 The Court held that, under the Tenth Amendment, states
retained the “freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
governmental functions” absent a particularly compelling federal interest.226
This legal doctrine, designed to protect state autonomy within the federal
system, has been abrogated, and the Court has left the protection of
traditional state functions to the national legislative process.227 The notion of
“traditional state functions” proved too nebulous for the courts to properly
enforce,228 and more importantly—though it supposedly derived from the
Tenth Amendment—the doctrine did not have a textual basis.229 The
municipal affairs doctrine, however, is explicitly present in the text of the

221. Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 209 (1903)
222. National League, 426 U.S. at 851–52 (listing examples).
223. Id. at 855.
224. Id. at 842.
225. Id. at 843.
226. Id. at 852, 856 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (stating that the Court “adopts a balancing
approach, and does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed federal
standards would be essential”).
227. George A. Bermann, The Role of Law in the Functioning of Federal Systems, in THE
FEDERAL VISION: LEGITIMACY AND LEVELS OF GOVERNANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
EUROPEAN UNION 191, 202 (Kalypso Nicolaïdis & Robert Howse eds., 2001); see Garcia, 469 U.S.
at 551–52.
228. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 531.
229. See U.S. CONST. amend. X; Garcia, 469 U.S. at 547–49. Even acknowledging this textual
ambiguity, Justice O’Connor dissented in a stirring opinion that chastised the Court for “retreat[ing]
rather than reconcil[ing] the Constitution’s dual concerns for federalism and an effective commerce
power.” Id. at 581 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Likewise, Justice Powell accused the Court of
“reduc[ing] the Tenth Amendment to meaningless rhetoric.” Id. at 560 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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state constitution.230 Whether or not Justice Cooley was correct that the
framers of state constitutions never intended to give up local control of local
affairs, it is clear, in California at least, that the people intended to take such
power back.231 Furthermore, the common law distinction favored by the
Ashworth and Henshaw dissenters is much more workable than the National
League doctrine. The rule is abstract and based on the territorial reach of
legislation rather than ad hoc divisions of labor based on competing
interests, which means it will not become obsolete as governmental practices
at the state and local level develop. If the California Supreme Court were to
adopt such a rule, a doctrine similar to that of National League, based on
ascertainable historical facts about state and local government, should be
employed to clarify the distinction.
Another useful doctrinal analogy between home rule and federalism is
the rule that, while Congress often is possessed of the constitutional
authority to regulate a matter that is within the competence of a state, it may
not simply commandeer the machinery of the state government to do so.232
It may set up its own enforcement regime or it may provide incentives for
the states to comply, but it may not compel the states to act.233 While the nocommandeering doctrine is not directly stated in the text of the constitution,
it is plausible as a legal doctrine because of the intuition that a government
without control of its own internal processes and officers is not a separate
government at all.234 Commandeering is an apt description for the kind of
legislative control exercised over California’s city governments under
Dillon’s rule, and the California Supreme Court made clear that this
commandeering was based on a political theory—that cities were not
legitimate, separate institutions of government but merely arms of the

230. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a).
231. People v. Hoge, 55 Cal. 612, 618 (1880) (“It was manifestly the intention of [the people] to
emancipate municipal governments from the authority and control formerly exercised over them by
the Legislature, and this is the more apparent in view of the fact that the charter framed by . . . the
vote of the people, cannot be amended by the Legislature.”).
232. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 153–54, 161 (1992) (striking down a federal
statute that compelled the individual states to either pass legislation which complied with minimum
federal standards or be subject to sanctions which included a “take title” provision—vesting title to
nuclear waste, and all the liability that it implied, in the state).
233. Id. at 188. This constitutional prohibition applies to the executive as well as the legislative
functions of the state. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997).
234. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 928.
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state.235 The people of California, however, rejected that political theory
when they affirmed that a city “may frame a charter for its own government”
which “shall become the organic law thereof.”236 Just as the people of a state
have the right to operate their own government and have the integrity of that
government respected by the nation, the people of a city have the right to
operate their own government and have the integrity of that government
respected by the state.237
But the federal government is not without recourse to set policy at the
state level in pursuit of federal interests. The Supreme Court has
acknowledged Congress’s broad authority to place conditions on the use of
funds it provides under its power to tax and spend for the general welfare. 238
This power to set conditions permits the federal government to influence
state policy so long as it does not “dragoon[]” the states with punitive and
coercive conditions.239 Just as the no-commandeering doctrine does not
leave the federal government without a role in setting state policy, the
analogous principle of home rule does not leave the statewide government
without a role in setting local policy. The California Supreme Court has
made clear that the state has an interest, sufficient to render a charter city
subject to general laws, in deciding how state money is spent.240 The
authority of the state to dictate local policy in charter cities, however,
depends upon an implicit bargain in which the charter city agrees to exercise
its authority over municipal affairs in a particular way and the state agrees in
turn to provide the necessary funds.241 If the state does not provide the
235. See Pattison v. Bd. of Supervisors, 13 Cal. 175, 184 (1859) (“[Cities and counties] are both
political and geographical divisions of the State. They are both the subjects of its political dominion.
The local governments derive their powers from the paramount political head, which, while it cedes
to certain local agents certain powers, does not thereby remit its rightful and ultimate dominion . . .
.”).
236. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. XI, § 8 (emphasis added).
237. See People v. Lynch, 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
238. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes . . .
and provide for . . . [the] general Welfare of the United States . . . .”); see, e.g., South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
239. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2574 (2012).
240. See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 562
(2012).
241. The United States Supreme Court, in some of its recent cases on the subject, has expressed
this theory of funding conditions set by Congress. See, e.g., Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ.
v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S.
1, 17 (1981)) (holding, based on the contractual theory, that Congress must provide unambiguous
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funds, the city has the prerogative of deciding how it will use its own
money.242
These doctrines, derived from the nature our federalist system, are
applicable by analogy to the law of municipal home rule. Just as the United
States Supreme Court once held that the independent sovereignty of the
states prevented Congress from regulating them “as states,”243 the California
Constitution’s protection of cities as independent entities should be
construed to “inhibit[] . . . any legislation which would directly affect cities
and towns as municipal corporations.”244 The state legislature must legislate
by “general laws” rather than “laws general in form,” which serve only to
nullify the political choices embodied in city charters.245 Just as the United
States Supreme Court continues to hold that the states may not be
commandeered by Congress to achieve its ends through them, it should also
be taken as a clear implication of the independent existence of cities under
the California Constitution that they may not be commandeered by the
legislature and compelled to fulfill its purposes for it.246 And finally, just as
the United States Supreme Court has held that Congress’s power to regulate
the states through spending conditions is limited,247 the California Supreme
Court should limit the state’s power to regulate cities through spending
conditions by requiring a direct connection between the funds being granted
or denied and the condition being exacted.248 The court should employ these
doctrines, along with the common law distinction between local and general
laws, which taken together provide a coherent doctrine of municipal home
rule.

notice of the conditions imposed); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185–87 (2002).
242. See Trades Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 559. The same general principle, that state regulation
should be accompanied by state money if it is to be imposed on local governments, is embodied in
the state constitution’s subvention requirement. See CAL. CONST. art. XIII B, § 6.
243. Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (emphasis added), overruled in
part by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
244. Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 402 (1899) (Temple, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
245. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5(a); Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899).
246. Compare New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992), with Trades Council, 54
Cal. 4th 547, 561–62.
247. See supra notes 234–39 and accompanying text.
248. Cf. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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VI. THE CASE FOR CLARITY
A. Principle: The Separation of Powers and Political Accountability
Replacing the Federal Savings analysis with the rule suggested here
would confine the legislature to its constitutionally intended role and give
the courts a firm basis for restraint of the “mercurial discretion” that has
unfortunately characterized home rule doctrine.249 The design of the state
constitution, as understood by its drafters, calls for the legislature to play a
limited role, especially in local issues.250 Many of the drafters even
understood the restriction of legislative involvement in local issues to be the
entire purpose of the convention.251 They envisioned a legislature which
devoted itself to “the perfecting of the Codes” and the decision of general
questions about the rights and obligations of citizens, leaving matters of
local concern and city government in the hands of cities.252 The distinction
between general laws and local laws would encourage that division of labor,
and the democratic accountability it strengthens, by requiring the legislature
to act through its own broad regulatory power rather than politically
insulating itself by commandeering the apparatus of local government.
Furthermore, by applying this distinction even-handedly, the courts could
relieve themselves of the obligation to “adjust[] the conflict” between state
and local governments “on [each case’s] own facts” without guidance from
the constitution and confine itself to applying workable legal standards.253
B. Practicality: Cooperative Localism
In June of 1978, the people of California enacted the Jarvis-Gann
initiative constitutional amendment, commonly known as Proposition 13, in
response to excessive local property taxes that steadily rose due to
inflationary pressures on the real estate market.254 When the legality of the
initiative was tested in the supreme court, a school district unsuccessfully
asserted that it was unconstitutional as a fundamental change to the “basic
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
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Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991).
See 2 SECOND CONVENTION, supra note 44, at 750 (Mr. Reynolds).
See, e.g., 3 id. at 1406–07 (Mr. Hager).
2 id. at 750 (Mr. Reynolds).
Federal Savings, 54 Cal. 3d at 15–16.
See generally GRODIN ET AL., supra note 2, at 259.
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governmental plan” of the constitution, which had to be initiated by the
legislature.255 While the court rejected the district’s argument,256 a major
change in California government did result from Proposition 13: state
funding of local government increased to substitute for the funds lost as a
result of the limitations.257
In light of this fiscal reality, the direct impact of Trades Council on the
state and local power relationship will be minimal, because the holding of
the case only applies to projects funded entirely out of local revenues.258 But
the indirect impact of reviving the original, textual meaning of the Municipal
Affairs Clause would be to preserve the possibility of local independence.
Some scholars of cooperative federalism have argued that the states are able
to participate in the creation of policy despite the growth of the federal
government primarily because they are capable of withdrawing their support
and making implementation more difficult.259 This kind of give and take,
which Professor Heather Gerken calls “uncooperative federalism,” has
enabled the states to resist and modify federal policy delegated to them for
enforcement.260 The ability of a peripheral government to resist central
authority, according to Gerken, derives partly from the impracticality of the
central authority micromanaging the enforcement.261 But an additional
source of potential influence derives from the split nature of the state
official’s loyalties and the dual sources of his power.262 The state official is
answerable to the state electorate as well as the federal government, and he
may draw upon the political and monetary resources of the state to support
his resistance to federal power.263 Both of these sources of power would be
nullified, however, if the federal government was capable of commandeering

255. Amador Valley Joint Union High Sch. Dist. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 224
(1978).
256. See id.
257. Barry Winograd, San Jose Revisited: A Proposal for Negotiated Modification of Public
Sector Bargaining Agreements Rejected Under Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 37 HASTINGS L.J.
231, 303 (1985) (“Revenues lost after Proposition 13 [were] replaced largely by surplus funds from
the state treasury, and the actual shortfalls were much less than were anticipated . . . .”).
258. See 54 Cal.4th at 559.
259. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J.
1256, 1270–84 (2009).
260. Id. at 1271–84.
261. See id. at 1266–67.
262. See id. at 1270–71.
263. See id.
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the machinery of the state government to achieve its purposes in strict
detail.264 The state official would have no resources to employ that the
central authority could not simply take from him or compel him to use in the
way it sees fit.265 The same fate would befall cities if the courts do not
sustain their right to withhold their cooperation from state programs like the
prevailing wage law for their own reasons.
VII. TRADES COUNCIL AND SB7
The California Supreme Court, applying the Federal Savings analysis,
found that the Public Wage Rate Act could not be enforced against a charter
city.266 What remains unclear is whether it would find SB7 unconstitutional
under that analysis. However, if the court adopted the rule proposed in this
Comment, derived from the text, purpose, and theory of the clause itself,
both cases would be clear. The court should hold that the Public Wage Rate
Act could not be enforced against a charter city because it would be an
unconstitutional commandeering of the city government’s contracting
authority. And it should hold that SB7 is unconstitutional because it is a
coercive and punitive funding condition intended to dragoon charter cities
into compliance.
A. The Legislative Overreach of SB7
On October 13, 2013, Governor Brown approved Senate Bill 7, a
legislative response to the holding in Trades Council.267 The statute was
passed specifically in response to that case268 and provides that “[a] charter
city shall not receive or use state funding or financial assistance for a
construction project if the city has a charter provision or ordinance that
authorizes a contractor to not comply with the provisions of this article on
any public works contract.”269 The statute also repeats the economic
justifications for the prevailing wage law, citing the enhancement of wages
and training opportunities to support the construction industry and maintain
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
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See id.
See id.
See supra, notes 136–45 and accompanying text.
2013 Cal. Stat. 794 (SB7), codified at CAL. LAB. CODE §1782 (2014).
See id. at §1(f).
CAL. LAB. CODE §1782(a).
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middle-class jobs.270 It asserts that some charter cities do comply with the
prevailing wage law and that those cities provide a state-wide benefit that
justifies providing funding to them only and not to cities that do not.271 This
is referred to as a “financial incentive”272 and asserted to be a minor and
justifiable burden. The League of California Cities disagrees. When the
governor signed the bill, the League issued a press release declaring that the
important issue is not the value of the prevailing wage law but “whether the
legislation undermines the constitutional powers that California voters more
than 100 years ago conferred on charter cities and their voters alone.”273
That is the issue, and the resolution of that issue may turn on how the court
articulates the applicable law.
B. Analyzing SB7 Under Federal Savings
The first issue in applying the Federal Savings analysis to the statute is
whether it “can be characterized as” a municipal affair.274 Because it
purports only to determine which cities the state wishes to provide funds to,
the state may argue that no municipal affair is involved. Just as the use of
municipal funds is a municipal affair, the use of state funds is a matter of
statewide concern.275 However, to assert that this statute is merely about
legislative funding priorities is pure chicanery. The only way it affects the
state’s spending priorities is to make the implicit judgment that coercing
charter cities into foregoing their constitutional authority is a higher priority
than distributing public works funding according to actual infrastructural
needs. For this reason, the court should find, even under the Federal
Savings analysis, that the statute concerns a municipal affair. It is clearly
intended to overturn Trades Council’s holding by statute, and to allow it to
do so would be to subordinate the state constitution to the legislature.
But the legislature does not always broadcast its intent to undo a

270. 2013 Cal. Stat. 794, §1(a)–(d).
271. Id. at §1(g)–(j).
272. Id. at §1(j).
273. Press Release, League of California Cities, Statement on Governor Brown's Signing of SB 7
(Steinberg) (Oct. 14, 2013), available at http://www.cacities.org/Top/News/Press-Releases/
2013/October/League-of-California-Cities%E2%80%99-Statement-on-Governor [hereinafter Press
Release].
274. State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547, 557 (2012).
275. Id. at 561–62.
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constitutional decision as it has done in this case.276 Applying the rule
proposed in this Comment, the court could protect constitutional home rule
even in a less clear case.
C. Analyzing the Public Wage Rate Act Under the Proposed Rule
If the court had applied the proposed rule in deciding Trades Council,
the result would have been the same. The application of the Public Wage
Rate Act to charter cities would be unconstitutional for two reasons. First,
the prevailing wage law, as applied, would constitute a local law. At first
glance, it may appear that the act is a general law, because it concerns
contractual obligations—a valid subject of general legislation.277 But the act
does not in fact concern the law of contracts, it concerns government
contracts qua government contracts—the ways in which government
contracts differ from private contracts.278 The rationale of such legislation is
not to enable bargaining between market participants, but to restrain public
market participants so that “government contractors [are] not . . . allowed to
circumvent locally prevailing labor market conditions by importing cheap
labor from other areas.”279 The case is distinguishable from the statute
upheld in Ex parte Braun, because while that law established the right of all
persons within the state to be free of taxation upon their occupation, the
Prevailing Wage Act directs the actions of public agencies only and has no
general application to all the people of the state.280 As applied to state
agencies, it is clearly a general law, applicable beyond the territory of any
city. But as applied to charter cities, it is merely a law “general in form”281
that concerns the internal affairs of the city and thus falls within the

276. 2013 Cal. Stat. 794, §1(f).
277. See Thomason v. Ashworth, 73 Cal. 73, 92 (1887) (McKinstry, J., dissenting) (listing among
the proper subjects of general legislation “the mode of contracting”).
278. See CAL. LAB. CODE § 1720 (West 2013).
279. Indep. Roofing Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Indus. Relations, 23 Cal. App. 4th 345,
356 (1994) (quoted in State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal. v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th 547,
555 (2012)).
280. Compare Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 219 (1903) (Beatty, C.J., dissenting), with Trades
Council, 54 Cal. 4th at 589 (Liu, J., dissenting). On this same theory, the court could have reached
the result it did in Federal Savings, because in that case the law merely established the rights of
private parties to be free of taxation in excess of the state income tax. See Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 6–7 (1991).
281. Popper v. Broderick, 123 Cal. 456, 461 (1899).
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narrowest proposed definition of municipal affairs.282
The act is also unconstitutional under the rule against commandeering.
Even the Trades Council dissenters admitted what in substance the
prevailing wage law does:
[T]he Legislature has chosen to influence [construction
industry] wages through the market-based approach of
directing the purchasing power of public entities to support
union-level wages. . . . [This] represents a legislative
judgment that direct regulation of private labor markets is
not necessary to accomplish the statute’s goals given the
substantial role that public works projects play in
influencing private sector construction workers’ wages and
in supporting apprenticeship programs.283
This is the real issue regarding the Prevailing Wage Act. While the state
may choose to use its own money to achieve its economic policy goals rather
than enact burdensome regulation on the private sector, it may not choose to
use the resources of another government to achieve those goals.284 Freedom
from this kind of commandeering is “the heart of what it means to be an
independent governmental entity.”285 As the League of California Cities has
argued,286 the state asserts this very principle when defending its own
independence, as demonstrated by its recent complaint against the United
States Department of Labor.287 In its complaint, the state accuses the federal
government of presenting “California with a Hobson’s choice—change its
pension reform legislation or forgo more than $1 billion of federal transit
funds,” which “undermine[s] the independent fiscal and legislative
sovereignty of California . . . .”288 In that case, the state correctly ascertains
the issue: “Only California elected officials may spend California's
money.”289 The same principle applies to charter cities.
282. See Fragley v. Phelan, 126 Cal. 383, 387 (1899) (Garoutte, J.) (plurality opinion).
283. 54 Cal. 4th at 587–89 (Liu, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
284. See id. at 562 (majority opinion).
285. Id.
286. See Press Release, supra note 273.
287. Complaint, California v. United States Department of Labor (13-CV-02069), 2013 WL
5548885 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2013).
288. Id. at ¶94.
289. Id. at ¶97.
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D. Analyzing SB7 Under the Proposed Rule
Because the holding of Trades Council applies only to projects funded
entirely without state support, the legislature is fully capable of achieving its
substantive goal by working cooperatively with local governments and
providing the funds necessary to pay the higher wage rates.290 But SB7, the
recently passed legislation designed to enforce the prevailing wage law
against charter cities, opts instead for fiscal coercion—withholding revenue
from taxes paid by all taxpayers unless the city capitulates to terms the state
could not have forced on them by statute. Applying the restriction on
funding conditions set by Congress, the Supreme Court recently found a
similar provision unconstitutional.291 The California Supreme Court, in
defending a similar constitutional doctrine, should reach a similar result. For
the state to legitimately place conditions on funds, those conditions should
actually relate to the use of the funds.
VIII. CONCLUSION
While it protected the home rule autonomy of the City of Vista in
Trades Council, the California Supreme Court continues to interpret the
Municipal Affairs Clause in a case-by-case fashion that undermines certainty
and the rule of law.292 Justice MacFarland’s prophecy in Ex parte Braun has
proven self-fulfilling, and the court since Federal Savings has not attempted
to ground its analysis in the clause itself.293 Instead, it gives deference to the
legislature and decides each case on its own facts.294 But the history of
California’s constitution demonstrates that it was skepticism of the

290. See id.
291. Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2607 (2012) (“Nothing in our
opinion precludes Congress from offering funds under the Affordable Care Act to expand the
availability of health care, and requiring that States accepting such funds comply with the conditions
on their use. What Congress is not free to do is to penalize States that choose not to participate in
that new program by taking away their existing Medicaid funding.”)
292. See supra notes 124–65 and accompanying text.
293. Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. City of L.A., 54 Cal. 3d 1, 16 (1991) (“The idea that the
content of ‘municipal affairs’ is indefinite in its essentials is one that has taken root in our cases on
the subject.”); Ex parte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 214 (1903) (McFarland, J., concurring) (“[N]o doubt,
in the future each case involving the question will be decided on its own facts, without an attempt at
generalization.”).
294. See State Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council of Cal., AFL-CIO v. City of Vista, 54 Cal. 4th
547, 557–58 (2012).
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legislature and the desire for settled, clear, and expansive protection of local
self-government that motivated the creation of the Constitution of 1879 and
the Municipal Affairs Amendment in 1896.295 The court once attempted to
interpret the clause based upon the people’s intent, and it may do so again.296
Guided by the text, purpose, and political theory of the Municipal Affairs
Clause, the court has the obligation to preserve California’s system of
divided sovereignty and ensure that the people’s right to local selfgovernment is preserved by the constitution they have framed for its
preservation.297
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295. See supra notes 60–110 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 79–110 and accompanying text.
297. See supra notes 167–253 and accompanying text.
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